

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00208 01 OF 02 221937 Z

63

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

( ADP ) W

----- 003923

O 221850 Z MAY 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2006

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0208

EXDIS SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SALT: MEETING OF MAY 22, 1973

REF: USDEL SALT TWO II 0205

1. SUMMARY. SUBSEQUENT TO STATEMENTS BY SEMENOV AND JOHNSON ( REPORTED REFTEL), KLOSSON AND NITZE RESPONDED TO SOVIET QUESTIONS OF MAY 18. SHCHUKIN GAVE STATEMENT ON PARTIAL AGREEMENTS AND TRUSOV ADDRESSED AIR- TO- SURFACE MISSILES. END SUMMARY.

2. KLOSSON ANSWERED TRUSOV' S QUESTION ON GEOGRAPHIC AND OTHER FACTORS AND NITZE ANSWERED SHCHUKIN' S QUESTION ON QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON SLBMS AND BOMBERS ( SEE FOLLOWING TEXTS).

3. SHCHUKIN RECALLED SOVIET SUGGESTION THAT, TOGETHER WITH WORKING OUT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PROVISION ON WHOLE RANGE OF QUESTIONS RELATED TO MORE COMPLETE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, SIDES SHOULD SEEK WAYS TO WORK OUT AGREEMENT ON INDIVIDUAL MATTERS. HE SAID THAT IT APPEARS US SIDE IS, IN PRINCIPLE, ALSO IN FAVOR OF RE-SOLVING INDIVIDUAL MATTERS WITHOUT POSTPONING THESE UNTIL  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00208 01 OF 02 221937 Z

COMPLETE AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED. HE THEN CALLED FOR DISCUSSION OF WHICH QUESTIONS IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CONCENTRATE ON NOW. AMBASSADOR JOHNSON REPLIED TO SEMENOV BY POINTING OUT THAT US STATEMENT OF MAY 8 MADE IT CLEAR THAT US WAS PREPARED TO DEAL WITH THESE INDIVIDUAL MATTERS ONLY IN CONTEXT OF OVERALL AGREEMENT.

4. TRUSOV RETURNED TO SOVIET PROPOSALS BANNING STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES ON AIRBORNE PLATFORMS AND ON LONG- RANGE AIR- TO- SURFACE MISSILES. HE SAID HE FAILED TO UNDERSTAND WHY US OMITTS THE FORMER FROM CONSIDERATION. ANY ATTEMPT TO TIE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH AIR DEFENSE IS ABSOLUTELY UNCONVINCING SINCE THESE SYSTEMS ARE NOT RELATED. ANY DESIRE TO EVADE A SOLUTION COULD ONLY BE VIEWED AS ATTEMPT TO OPEN A NEW CHANNEL FOR BUILD- UP OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. TRUSOV WAS PUZZLED BY STATEMENT OF ROWNY MAY 18 WHICH HE SAID REVEALED TENDENCY TOWARD BUILD- UP IN CAPABILITY OF STRATEGIC AVIATION. HE CLAIMED US SIDE WELL UNDERSTOOD THAT WHAT WAS INVOLVED IN TALKING ABOUT RANGE OF SUCH MISSILES WAS NOT AT ALL MEASURED IN THOUSANDS OF KILOMETERS AND SAID UNDERSTANDING ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SHOULD BLOCK ANY CHANNEL FOR THEIR BUILD- UP. JOHNSON RECALLED SPECIFIC US PROPOSAL MADE ON MAY 8 AND AMPLIFIED BY ROWNY MAY 18. JOHNSON GATHERED THAT TRUSOV DID NOT AGREE WITH US LIMITATION OF 3,000 KILOMETERS BUT NOTED IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT SOVIET DEFINITION WOULD BE. SOVIET SIDE DID NOT RESPOND.

QUESTION POSED BY GENERAL TRUSOV

MAY 18, 1973

( ANSWERED BY MR. KLOSSON, MAY 22, 1973)

THE SOVIET SIDE ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS HAS REFERRED TO THE NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT GEOGRAPHIC AND OTHER FACTORS IN CONSIDERING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN ALL ITS TOTALITY.

THE AMERICAN SIDE ADDRESSED THIS POINT ON APRIL 6. SINCE THE QUESTION HAS BEEN RAISED AGAIN BY GENERAL TRUSOV ON MAY 18, WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING OBERVATIONS TO MAKE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00208 01 OF 02 221937 Z

GEOGRAPHY IS A CONSTANT FACTOR, BUT ITS SIGNIFICANCE IS CONSTANTLY SUBJECT TO CHANGE.

FOR EXAMPLE, THE LOCATION OF REGIONS, THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THEM, THE EXISTENCE OF NATURAL BARRIERS ALL REMAIN FIXED, BUT THEIR STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE CAN BE AND HAS BEEN RADICALLY ALTERED BY TECHNOLOGY. ONE NEED ONLY MENTION A

4,000- MILE MISSILE THAT CAN BE LAUNCHED FROM A SUBMARINE IN ITS HOME- PORT TO REACH ANOTHER CONTINENT WITHIN MINUTES. THIS FACT CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THAT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GEOGRAPHY IS NECESSARILY RELATIVE, NOT ABSOLUTE.

IN CONSIDERING THE FACTOR OF GEOGRAPHY, EACH SIDE UNDERSTANDABLY LOOKS AT ITS OWN SITUATION. THE UNITED STATES FINDS ITSELF:

- NEARLY 2 1/2 TIMES SMALLER THAN THE LARGEST COUNTRY IN THE WORLD;
- EXPOSED TO THE EAST, WEST, AND SOUTH BY THOUSANDS OF MILES OF ACCESSIBLE COAST LINE;
- WITH ABOUT ONE- HALF OF ITS PEOPLE LIVING WITHIN 150 MILES OF THE COASTLINE;
- WITH NEARLY THREE QUARTERS OF ITS PEOPLE CONCENTRATED TOGETHER IN URBAN AREAS;
- WITH TWO OF ITS FIFTY STATES, HAWAII AND ALASKA, OCCUPYING SEPARATE AND DISTANT LOCATIONS.

SECRET  
NMAFVVZCZ

ADP000  
SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00208 02 OF 02 222111 Z

63  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

/026 W  
----- 002801

O 221850 Z MAY 73  
FM USDEL SALT TWO II  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2007

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0208

EXDIS SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

GIVEN THESE FACTS, THE DISADVANTAGES OF THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR FOR THE UNITED STATES BECOME APPARENT. IN ADDITION, THERE IS THE DISTANCE INVOLVED TO REENFORCE THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN SUPPORT OF ITS ALLIES, THE

UNITED STATES MUST COVER 5000 MILES. IN CONTRAST, THE SOVIET SIDE CAN REENFORCE MORE EASILY AND MORE QUICKLY SINCE IT NEEDS TO MOVE ONLY 500 MILES.

THERE ARE FACTORS OTHER THAN GEOGRAPHY THAT NEED TO BE EXAMINED. IN COUNTRY A, FOR EXAMPLE, INFORMATION CONCERNING MUCH OF ITS MILITARY, ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS MAY BE FREELY AVAILABLE. STRATEGIC DOCTRINE, DEFENSE BUDGET, FORCE COMPOSITIONS ARE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED AND DEBATED. IN COUNTRY B, IN CONTRAST, THERE MAY BE A TRADITION DEEPLY ROOTED IN HISTORY OF ENSURING STATE SECRECY AND BROAD AND RIGID REGULATIONS REGARDING WHAT INFORMATION SHOULD BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE. IN CONSIDERING "THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN ITS TOTALITY", CLEARLY COUNTRY B IN THIS COMPARISON ENJOYS AN ADVANTAGE.

DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL SYSTEMS, ECONOMIC PATTERNS, SOCIAL STRUCTURES, PHILOSOPHICAL OUTLOOKS, HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES ABOUND BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THE QUESTION AS WE SEE IT IS NOT WHETHER NON-MILITARY FACTORS HAVE AN INFLUENCE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00208 02 OF 02 222111 Z

ON THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, BUT RATHER WHETHER THEY CAN BE CONSIDERED IN AN EVEN-HANDED MANNER AND WHETHER IT WOULD NOT DIVERT US FROM MORE IMPORTANT AND USEFUL WORK TO ATTEMPT TO DO SO. IN VIEW OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THESE QUESTIONS AND THEIR INHERENTLY SUBJECTIVE NATURE, THE REASONABLE AND PRACTICAL COURSE IS FOR EACH SIDE TO ACCEPT THESE DIFFERENCES, TO COEXIST WITH THEM, AND TO CONCENTRATE OUR FOCUS ON THE MORE USEFUL SUBJECT OF THOSE PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS ON OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH MORE IMPORTANTLY DETERMINE THE BALANCE BETWEEN US AND ITS STRATEGIC STABILITY.

QUESTION POSED BY ACADEMICIAN SHCHUKIN

ON MAY 18, 1973

(ANSWERED BY MR. NITZE, MAY 22, 1973)

ON MAY 18 TH, ACADEMICIAN SHCHUKIN SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO THE SOVIET SIDE TO LEARN THE VIEW OF THE U. S. DELEGATION ON WAYS TO ESTABLISH QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, PARTICULARLY SLBMS AND STRATEGIC BOMBERS.

THE U. S. PROPOSAL FOR A PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT WOULD FREEZE MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE SYSTEMS ON ICBMS, BUT WOULD NOT FREEZE MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE SYSTEMS ON SLBMS.

IT IS THE VIEW OF THE U. S. SIDE THAT SLBMS PLAY A DIFFERENT ROLE WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC STABILITY THAN DO ICBMS. THE MOBILITY OF SUBMARINES, IN COMBINATION WITH THE DIFFICULTY OF DETERMINING THE LOCATION OF OBJECTS UNDER THE SURFACE OF THE

SEA, MAKES THEM LESS VULNERABLE TO ATTACK THAN LAND- BASED ICBM  
SILOS. THERE ARE OBJECTIVE PRACTICAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE  
SIZE OF SLBMS. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF HIGH ACCURACY IN SLBMS,  
WHILE, IN THEORY, NOT AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK, PRESENTS INHERENTLY  
MORE DIFFICULT PRACTICAL PROBLEMS THAN DOES THE  
ACHIEVEMENT OF COMPARABLE ACCURACY IN ICBMS.

UNDER THE U. S. PROPOSAL FOR A PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT, BOTH  
SIDES WOULD BE FREE TO DEVELOP, FLIGHT TEST, PRODUCE AND  
DEPLOY MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE SYSTEMS ON SLBMS.

WITH REGARD TO QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON HEAVY BOMBERS,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00208 02 OF 02 222111 Z

THE U. S. PROPOSAL OF MAY 8 TH INCLUDED A STATEMENT THAT IN THE  
CONTEXT OF ITS OTHER PROPOSALS OF THAT DATE FOR A PERMANENT  
AGREEMENT, THE U. S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A BAN ON  
THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF AIR-  
TO- SURFACE MISSILES WITH A MAXIMUM RANGE GREATER THAN  
3,000 KILOMETERS.

GENERAL ROWNY, ON MAY 18 TH, OUTLINED U. S. ATTITUDES WITH  
RESPECT TO THAT SUBJECT. JOHNSON

SECRET

NMAFVVZCZ

\*\*\* Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* EXDIS

\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* SECRET

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 22 MAY 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973SALTT00208  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** XGDS1  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** SALT TALKS  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t19730551/aaaajpit.tel  
**Line Count:** 251  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ACTION SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** 73 USDEL SALT TWO II 0205  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 31 JAN 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <31-Jan-2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <19 FEB 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** <DBA CORRECTED> mcm 980226  
**Subject:** SALT: MEETING OF MAY 22, 1973  
**TAGS:** PARM  
**To:** SECSTATE WASHDC  
SS  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005